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Abstract: Positive	obligations	of	States	to	protect	
and	implement	human	rights	are	considered	a	part	
of	various	effects	of	human	rights	 in	 legislations.	
In	this	article,	 it	 is	argued	that	a	crucial	problem	
arises	from	the	inconsistent	practice	of	addressing	
violations	of	human	rights	committed	by	 juristic	
persons	together	with	a	lack	of	underlying	general	
theory	of	liability	for	human	rights	violations	com-
mitted	by	private	entities.	Without	a	major	change	
in	the	legal	doctrine	and	case-law,	we	will	need	to	
remain	focused	on	the	role	of	the	State	as	a	guaran-
tor	of	human	rights,	rather	than	on	the	imposition	
of	 human	 rights	 obligations	 on	 private-law	 enti-
ties.	In	this	article,	it	is	argued	that	the	nature	of	
the	relationship	between	a	juristic	person	and	the	
State	is	not	the	only	relevant	aspect,	as	we	should	
also	examine	the	activity	of	the	juristic	person	in	
question.	
Keywords: Positive	obligations	of	States.	Juristic	
persons.	State-juristic	person	nexus.	Fundamental	
rights.	Horizontal	effect.
Resumo:	Obrigações	estatais	positivas	de	proteger	
e	de	implementar	direitos	humanos	são	parte	dos	
vários	efeitos	dos	direitos	humanos	nas	legislações	
nacionais.	Neste	artigo,	argumenta-se	que	um	pro-
blema	crucial	decorre	da	prática	de	abordar	viola-
ções	 de	 direitos	 humanos	 cometidas	 por	 pessoas	
jurídicas	sem	uma	teoria	geral	da	responsabilidade	
por	 violações	 de	 direitos	 humanos	 cometidas	 por	
entidades	privadas.	Sem	uma	mudança	importante	
na	 doutrina	 e	 na	 jurisprudência	 será	 preciso	 per-
manecer	 olhando	 apenas	 para	 o	 papel	 do	 Estado	
como	garantidor	de	direitos	humanos.	Neste	artigo	
argumenta-se	que	a	natureza	da	relação	entre	uma	
pessoa	 jurídica	 e	 o	 Estado	 não	 é	 o	 único	 aspecto	
relevante.	É	preciso	examinar	também	a	atividade	
da	pessoa	jurídica	em	questão.
Palavras-chave:	Obrigações	positivas	dos	Estados.	
Pessoas	jurídicas.	Pessoas	jurídicas	de	direito	priva-
do.	Direitos	fundamentais.	Eficácia	horizontal.
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Introduction
In	the	comprehensive	introductory	part	to	his	book	concerning	human	rights	obligations	
of	transnational	corporations,	distinguished	Belgian	scholar	Olivier de Schutter	describes	various	cir-
cumstances	that	have	contributed	to	contemporary	vivid	debates	about	the	forms	of	responsibility	
borne	by	private	corporations	in	respect	of	violations	of	human	rights	(De	Schutter,	2006,	pp.	1	et	
seq).	He	describes	 ‘two	waves	of	corporate	social	 responsibility’:	after	the	first	attempts	to	hold	
transnational	 corporations	 (TNCs)	 accountable	 in	 the	1970s,	 this	 agenda	has	 again	been	 largely	
discussed	since	the	1990s.	Social	transformations	triggered	by	economic,	cultural	as	well	as	 legal	
globalisation	became	a	major	force	that	led	both	to	efforts	to	regulate	TNCs’	conduct	(with	NGOs	
leading	the	main	efforts	in	this	field)	and	to	prevent	this	kind	of	regulation	of	TNCs’	conduct	(ob-
viously	driven	by	TNCs	themselves	and	various	organised	interests	acting	on	their	behalf).	
De	Schutter’s	approach	corresponds	to	the	well-known	thesis	of	various	modern	scho-
ols	of	 jurisprudence.	On	the	one	hand,	system	theorists,	such	as	German	legal	sociologist	Niklas	
Luhmann,	describe	 law	as	 a	 cognitively	open	 system	which	 interacts	with	 its	 environment	 and	
changes,	albeit	not	automatically,	but	according	to	its	own	self-referential	(autopoietic)	program-
mes	(Luhmann,	1988,	p.	20).	Modern	legal	positivists	describe	 law	as	a	social	fact,	which	means	
that	law	is	a	social	creation	or	artefact	(Himma,	2002,	p.	126).	Not	only	the	activity	of	law-making	
bodies,	but	also	application	of	law	by	courts	and	other	governmental	authorities	has	a	formative	
character	on	law.3	A	key	source	of	the	need	to	come	up	with	a	broader	human	rights	regulation	may	
be	seen	in	the	growing	importance	of	businesses.4	According	to	the	above-mentioned	theories	of	
law,	even	fundamental	rights	must	respond	to	the	social	environment.
The	growing	importance	of	juristic	persons	is	often	described	with	reference	to	their	we-
alth	(Wells	&	Elias,	2005,	p.	147).	In	2014,	the	gross	national	income	of	the	Czech	Republic,	a	State	
with	more	 than	10.5	million	 inhabitants,	approximately	equalled	 the	 foreign	assets	of	Vodafone	
Group	plc	(Ondřejková	&	Ondřejek,	2016,	p.	137).	Data	from	2016	show	that	while	the	GNI	of	the	
Czech	Republic	increased	slightly,	Vodafone’s	foreign	assets	fell	by	25%	to	USD	143	million.	On	the	
other	hand,	the	foreign	assets	of	the	Volkswagen	Group	car	manufacturer	increased	by	20%	between	
2012	and	2016,	and	the	foreign	assets	of	the	food	and	beverages	producer	Anheuser-Busch	InBev	NV	
rose	as	much	as	by	81%	during	the	same	period.5	Companies’	foreign	assets	thus	change	faster	than	
those	of	States.6	Apart	from	this	fact,	some	of	the	largest	companies	are	economically	stronger	than	
some	countries	(the	foreign	assets	of	both	Volkswagen	and	Anheuser-Busch	now	exceed	the	GNI	
of	the	Czech	Republic).	This	‘financial	strength’	of	juristic	persons	results	in	what	is	described	in	
3 	Different	types	of	norm	creation	are	compared	in	Gardner	(2012,	p.	54).
4 	See,	in	particular,	part	2	below.
5 	Data	available	at:	<http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/World%20Investment%20Report/Annex-Tables.aspx>.
6 	I	am	referring	to	States	under	‘normal’	conditions	–	not	during	revolutions,	civil	wars,	sudden	serious	economic	crises,	etc.	
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scholarly	literature	as	social	power	(Isensee,	2000,	p.	610).	It	is	not	surprising	that	this	power	is	used	
by	corporations	in	accordance	with	their	aim,	which	is	to	maximise	profit.	
De	Schutter	(2005,	p.	314)	argues	that	more	than	the	sheer	economic	weight	of	corpora-
tions,	their	social	power	results	from	their	ability	to	threaten	governments	with	closing	businesses	
and	moving	to	a	different	country,	which	may	lead	to	unemployment	and	other	negative	social	im-
pacts.	The	main	aim	of	companies	is	to	minimise	the	costs	of	governmental	regulation	concerning	
working	conditions,	environment,	negotiations	with	trade	unions,	etc.	Companies	thus,	in	a	certain	
way,	promote	a	race	among	States	to	the	bottom	in	human	rights	protection.	
In	my	opinion,	the	factual	power	and	potential	pressure	of	TNCs	on	governments,	toge-
ther	with	examples	of	human	rights	violations	in	which	private	companies	were	involved,	represent	
the	main	reasons	why	an	adequate	response	was	sought	to	also	protect	individuals	against	private	
corporations.	Today,	corporations	are	no	longer	entities	behind	which	concrete	individuals	do	bu-
siness,	which	was	the	original	reason	for	protecting	their	human	rights.7	On	the	other	hand,	they	
may	easily	violate	the	rights	of	individuals.	The	position	of	the	State	depends	on	our	understanding	
of	human	and	fundamental	rights.
In	this	article,	I	argue	that	a	classical	view	of	fundamental	rights	as	spheres	in	which	Sta-
tes	or	other	entities	endowed	with	public	power	cannot	interfere	is	incomplete,	if	not	even	obsolete.	
Fundamental	rights	are	more	importantly	related	to	the	status	of	individuals	who	are	entitled	to	
invoke	their	rights	before	governmental	bodies	even	if	these	rights	were	violated	by	another	indivi-
dual	(Bleckmann,	1997,	p.	15).8	At	present,	both	international	law	and	national	legislations	fail	to	
adequately	answer	the	question:	Vis-à-vis	which	entities	may	individuals	invoke	their	rights?	
As	Weissbrodt	and	Kruger	(2005)	argue,	
during	the	past	half-century	governments	have	codified	international	human	rights	law	protecting	
the	rights	of	individuals	against	governmental	violations.	With	increasing	attention	to	the	emergen-
ce	of	international	criminal	law	as	a	response	to	war	crimes,	genocide,	and	crimes	against	humanity,	
there	has	also	been	growing	attention	to	individual	responsibility	for	grave	human	rights	abuses.	In	
addition,	international	humanitarian	law	and	international	criminal	law	have	placed	obligations	on	
armed	opposition	forces	engaged	in	non-international	armed	conflicts.	This	web	of	human	rights	
obligations,	however,	has	not	paid	sufficient	attention	to	some	of	the	most	powerful	non-state	ac-
tors	in	the	world:	transnational	corporations	and	other	business	enterprises.	(p.	315).
For	decades,	theorists	tried	to	find	a	way	to	fill	in	the	possible	legal	vacuum	created	by	the	
fact	that	States	delegate	powers	to	private	entities	or	are	reluctant	to	ensure	protection	of	human	
rights	in	their	territories.	In	the	second	part,	I	will	illustrate	the	rather	unsatisfactory	efforts	to	hold	
private	corporations	accountable	for	human	rights	violations,	at	both	the	international	and	national	
7 	In	Germany,	this	justification	of	the	fundamental	rights	of	juristic	persons	is	described	by	the	term	‘Durchgriff ’	(pen-
etration)	of	the	fundamental	rights	of	 juristic	persons	towards	natural	persons	(Huber,	1999,	p.	2240).	Big	multinational	
corporations	usually	have	such	diverse	ownership	that	we	cannot	identify	any	concrete	persons	whose	human	rights	would	
be	threatened	in	case	of	limitation	of	the	rights	of	juristic	persons	(Isensee,	2000,	p.	610).
8 	Bleckmann	(1997)	argues	that	the	aim	of	human	rights	was	not	only	to	protect	individuals	vis-à-vis	the	State,	but	to	also	
ensure	basic	conditions	for	the	development	of	a	human	being	in	democratic	society.
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levels.	In	contrast,	special	international	agreements	may	establish	potential	corporate	liability	for	
misconduct.	The	next	part	focuses	on	gradual	broadening	of	the	scope	and	dimensions	of	human	
rights	since	1945.	With	regard	to	the	topic	of	this	article,	particular	attention	will	be	devoted	to	spe-
cification	of	the	content	of	positive	obligations.	Finally,	based	on	these	two	findings,	the	key	issue	
in	this	contribution	will	be	addressed,	specifically	whether	and	under	what	conditions	the	extension	
of	the	States’	positive	obligations	may	serve	as	a	remedy	for	violation	of	human	rights	of	individuals	
by	corporations.	As	an	example,	misconduct	of	private	corporations	in	the	Czech	Republic	will	be	
illustrated	with	a	view	to	highlighting	both	similarities	and	differences	compared	to	the	situations	
widely	described	in	the	scholarly	literature	which	relate	to	violations	of	fundamental	rights	com-
mitted	by	transnational	corporations	in	countries	of	the	third	world	or	during	military	conflicts.
1 Unsatisfactory efforts to hold business corporations accountable for human rights 
violations
The	history	of	TNCs’	obligations	ensuing	from	violation	of	human	rights	is	not	easy	to	
interpret.	 It	 is	 clear	 that	much	of	 the	discussion	about	 the	need	 for	 the	existence	of	obligations	
of	private	businesses	 in	protection	of	human	rights	 is	connected	with	their	 increasing	economic	
(Wells	&	Elias,	2005,	p.	147)	as	well	as	other	forms	of	power	(e.g.	influence	on	State’s	policies	or	
even	politics	in	the	forms	of	lobbying).	Some	documents,	namely	those	issued	by	NGOs	or	even	
UN,	advocate	relatively	wide	accountability	in	this	field.	For	instance,	the	document	entitled	UN	
Guiding	Principles	on	Business	and	Human	Rights,9	issued	in	2011,	contains,	in	its	part	II,	principles	
on	corporate	responsibility	to	respect	human	rights,	where	it	is	asserted	that	“the	responsibility	to	
respect	human	rights	is	a	global	standard	of	expected	conduct	for	all	business	enterprises,	wherever	
they	operate.”10	These	Guiding	Principles	followed	attempts	to	extend	the	applicability	of	human	
rights	from	States	and	other	public	entities	to	private	corporations,	which	had	been	made	both	in	
the	academic	literature	and	in	certain	soft-law	documents	adopted	by	UN,	OECD	(Francioni,	2011,	
p.	96).	A	brief	look	at	the	phrasing	of	these	documents	shows	that	they	are	written	in	somewhat	
vague	terms	and	contain	principles	and	goals,	instead	of	specific	obligations.	Some	more	ambitious	
efforts,	like	the	UN	draft	Code	of	Conduct	on	Transnational	Corporations	of	1992,	have	never	beco-
me	legally	binding.	This	may	be	due	to	the	fact	that	the	mentioned	document	imposes	more	specific	
obligations	upon	private	corporations:	
9 	United	Nations	Committee	on	Human	Rights,	Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Implementing the United 
Nations ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework.	New	York,	Geneva:	United	Nations,	2011,	developed	by	the	Special	Represen-
tative	of	the	Secretary-General	on	the	issue	of	human	rights	and	transnational	corporations	and	other	business	enterprises	
and	finally	endorsed	by	the	Human	Rights	Council	of	the	UN	in	its	resolution	17/4	of	16	June	2011,	available	at:
<http://www.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusi-
nessHR_EN.pdf&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1>.
10 	Ibid.,	p.	13.
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Transnational	corporations	shall	respect	human	rights	and	fundamental	freedoms	in	the	countries	
in	which	they	operate.	In	their	social	and	industrial	relations,	transnational	corporations	shall	not	
discriminate	on	the	basis	of	race,	colour,	sex,	religion,	language,	social,	national	and	ethnic	origin	or	
political	or	other	opinion.	(De	Schutter,	2006,	p.	2).	
Two	 important	 documents	 can	 be	mentioned	 from	 the	 early	 stages	 of	 efforts	 to	 hold	
private	corporations	accountable	for	human	rights	violations:	in	1976,	OECD	issued	its	Guidelines	
for	Multinational	Enterprises	and,	in	the	following	year,	ILO	adopted	the	Declaration	of	Principles	
concerning	Multinational	Enterprises.	Both	these	documents	were	non-binding	and	the	procedure	
applicable	before	established	national	contact	points	can	be	described	as	‘unsatisfactory’	and	‘gene-
rally	weak’	with	regard	to	securing	protection	of	human	rights	(De	Schutter,	2006,	p.	8).
Another	set	of	non-binding	documents	was	adopted	after	1990.	Based	on	an	incentive	from	
the	UN	Secretary	General	Kofi Annan,	a	set	of	principles	entitled	‘Global	Compact’	was	introduced	at	
the	1992	World	Economic	Forum	in	Davos	with	the	main	aim	of	stimulating	companies	to	volunta-
rily	adhere	to	this	initiative	for	observance	of	human	rights	and	to	issue	their	own	codes	of	conduct	
(Francioni,	2011,	p.	97).	Furthermore,	 a	major	 revision	of	 the	OECD	Guidelines	 for	Multinational	
Enterprises	was	carried	out	in	2000,	inter alia	establishing	national	contact	points	for	countries	that	
had	adopted	the	Guidelines.11	However,	the	development	was	not	straightforward	towards	more	am-
bitious	levels	of	liability	of	juristic	persons	for	violation	of	human	rights.	A	proposal	to	hold	juristic	
persons	liable	for	serious	violations	of	international	law	was	rejected	during	the	negotiations	on	the	
Rome	Statute	of	the	International	Criminal	Court	(De	Schutter,	2005,	pp.	232-233).	
From	 a	 broader	 perspective,	 Francioni	 (2011,	 p.	 97)	 rightly	 claims	 that	 “the	 project	 of	
reconceptualising	human	rights	obligations	has	become	problematic”;	indeed,	according	to	the	cur-
rent	state	of	development	of	case-law	and	legal	doctrine,	juristic	persons	are	not	directly	responsible	
for	violating	human	rights.	Francioni	mentions	three	reasons	for	this:	firstly,	direct	application	of	
human	rights	norms	to	private	actors	appears	to	be	problematic	and	such	application	would	require	
the	adoption	of	a	new	set	of	rules.	Secondly,	the	courts	currently	do	not	recognise	the	possibility	
of	direct	application	of	human	rights	standards	to	private	actors,	and	finally,	the	market	failures	
over	the	last	decade	have	undermined	the	belief	in	the	markets’	ability	to	generate	rules	that	would	
respect	public	goods,	including	human	rights.12 
Reinisch	(2005,	p.	82)	claims	that	direct	accountability	of	non-governmental	actors	is	un-
developed	in	human	rights	instruments	and	in	international	law	in	general.	The	problem	with	direct	
application	of	human	rights	to	private	entities	can	be	likened	to	debates	in	post-war	Germany,	both	
in	legal	doctrine	and	among	courts	(Broz	&	Ondřejek,	2014,	p.	112).	An	indirect	horizontal	effect	of	
fundamental	rights	has	been	recognised	since	1958	and	the	seminal	decision	of	the	German	Federal	
11 	The	text	of	the	Guidelines	is	available	on	the	official	website	of	OECD:	<http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.
pdf>.
12 	Ibid.,	pp.	97-98.	The	last	argument	has	been	proven	even	more	valid	after	the	last	major	global	financial	crisis,	which	
began	in	2008.	
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Constitutional	Court	in	Lüth.13	Direct	applicability	of	fundamental	rights	to	private	law	relations	is	
quite	exceptional.	However,	the	absence	of	a	direct	effect	can	be	considered	normal	if	one	takes	into	
account	the	history	and	objective	of	human	rights	which,	since	their	enactment	following	modern	
democratic	revolutions,	have	been	intended	to	ensure	protection	of	individuals	against	the	State.	
If	human	rights	were	fully	applicable	in	private	law,	this	could	endanger	the	specific	principles	of	
particular	branches	of	law.	In	the	extreme	case,	this	situation	could	render	the	division	of	law	into	
specific	branches,	 such	as	private,	administrative,	business	and	criminal,	useless	and	superfluous	
because	all	conflicts	would	be	reduced	to	questions	of	fundamental	rights.	
Voluntary	codes	of	conduct	adopted	by	private	corporations	have	also	not	–	in	my	opinion	
–	proven	to	be	an	adequate	tool	for	strengthening	the	protection	of	human	rights.	The	willingness	
of	a	company	to	issue	a	code	of	conduct	is	usually	motivated	by	the	anticipation	of	profit	(e.g.	by	
obtaining	better	reputation	that	could	help	it	compete	on	the	market),	rather	than	by	moral	obliga-
tions	or	beliefs	in	human	rights	(De	Schutter,	2005,	pp.	260-261).		
Problems	concerning	the	application	of	fundamental	rights	to	corporations	and	other	pri-
vate-law	entities	can	be	observed	not	only	in	international	legal	doctrine,	but	also	in	national	cons-
titutional	law.	During	the	process	of	adoption	of	the	Basic	Law	(Grundgesetz)	in	post-war	Germany,	
these	discussions	led	to	the	adoption	of	Art.	19	(3)	of	the	Basic	Law,	according	to	which	national	
juristic	persons	would	also	benefit	from	fundamental	rights	protected	by	the	Basic	Law,	so	long	as	
the	nature	of	these	rights	allowed	their	application.	While	nothing	was	stated	as	regards	juristic	per-
sons	as	addressees	of	the	duties	ensuing	from	constitutional	rights,	it	was	understood	that	juristic	
persons	of	public	law	could	not	become	beneficiaries	of	fundamental	rights.	However,	this	rule	was	
subject	to	certain	limitations	–	e.g.	public	broadcasting	corporations	could	benefit	from	freedom	of	
speech	and	churches	from	freedom	of	religion	(Huber,	1999,	pp.	2252-2255).	
The	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	has	adopted	a	similar	pragmatic	approach	with	
regard	to	 juristic	persons	of	private	 law	as	beneficiaries	of	 fundamental	 rights.	According	to	 the	
Court’s	case-law,	sufficient	independence	of	the	State	must	be	proven	in	this	regard.	Thus,	e.g.,	bu-
siness	corporations	owned	wholly	or	predominantly	by	the	State	are	not	independent	and	therefore	
cannot	invoke	fundamental	rights	for	their	protection	(Tymofeyeva,	2015,	p.	41)	referring	to	the	
European	Court	of	Human	Rights	case	of	Transpetrol	v.	Slovakia,	application	Nr.	40265/07,	decision	
of	15	November	2013.	
The	example	of	application	of	fundamental	rights	by	or	against	juristic	persons	illustrates	
the	increasing	dimensions	of	human	rights,	which	can	be	observed	in	both	legal	theory	and	judicial	
practice.	Before	addressing	a	 specific	example,	 these	various	dimensions	of	human	rights	will	be	
briefly	described.	
13 	BVerfGE,	7,	198,	Lüth,	Judgment	of	the	Federal	Constitutional	Court	of	the	Federal	Republic	of	Germany,	15	January	1958.
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2 Multiple dimensions of human rights
Fredman	(2008,	p.	1)	observes	that,	while	there	was	long	a	consensus	that	States	should	
not	interfere	with	the	fundamental	rights	of	individuals,	the	aspect	of	positive	actions	taken	by	Sta-
tes	has	traditionally	been	connected	with	policies	rather	than	with	law	on	human	rights.		When	the	
courts	began	acknowledging	the	positive	obligations	of	States,	the	distinction	between	negative	and	
positive	duties	was	also	described	as	various	dichotomies	–	civil	and	political	rights	vs.	socio-econo-
mic	rights,	liberty	vs.	equality,	justiciable	vs.	non-justiciable	rights	(Fredman,	2008,	p.	1).	However,	
further	judicial	practice	showed	that	these	dualisms	were	largely	artificial	and	at	the	present	time,	
in	the	practice	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	positive	obligations	of	States	are	recognised	
within	almost	every	right	protected	under	the	European	Convention	(Lavrysen,	2013,	p.	162).
Positive	obligations	of	States	are	not	the	only	example	of	the	changing	human	rights	ar-
chitecture.	Horizontal	effects	of	fundamental	rights	(i.e.	their	application	in	legal	relations	between	
private	persons)	are	another	example.	These	effects	appear	in	several	forms	acknowledged	by	parti-
cular	jurisdictions	–	as	direct,	indirect	or	through	judicial	decisions	(Barak,	2001,	pp.	13-41).	
Another	aspect,	which	is	somewhat	related,	is	a	phenomenon	referred	to	as	constitutio-
nalisation	of	law.	When	using	this	notion,	I	am	referring	to	the	effects	of	‘radiation’	or	‘infiltration’	
of	human	rights	into	various	branches	of	law.	This	occurs	especially	in	the	process	of	interpretation	
of	indefinite	legal	provisions.	This	‘constitutionally-conforming’	method	of	legal	reasoning	means	
that,	from	among	multiple	various	possible	interpretations	of	relatively	abstract	provisions,	only	
that	or	those	which	are	compatible	with	human	rights	are	taken	into	account.	
It	is	obvious	that	many	of	these	relatively	new	approaches	to	human	rights	favour	judicial	
interpretation	or	even	construction	of	law,	where	gaps	in	law	are	filled	and	law	is	applied,	e.g.	by	
the	way	of	analogical	reasoning	(for	the	distinction	between	interpretation	and	construction	see	
e.g.	Potacs	(2015,	pp.	140-142)).	This	strengthening	of	the	role	of	courts	means	primarily	that	they	
obtain	a	stronger	position	vis-à-vis	other	branches	of	government,	namely	the	legislature	and	the	
executive.	The	more	questions	are	decided	by	courts,	the	fewer	such	question	are	left	for	political	
democratic	 debates	 in	 the	parliament.	This	 possible	 shrinking	 of	 political	 issues	 in	 the	name	of	
human	rights	protection,	together	with	the	need	to	preserve	the	basic	principles	of	the	individual	
branches	of	law,	should	prevent	extensive	interpretation	of	the	process	of	constitutionalisation	of	
law	although,	in	the	contemporary	‘age	of	rights’,	it	is	impossible	to	ignore	the	human	rights	aspects	
of	any	particular	dispute.	I	nevertheless	believe	that	this	problem	of	reducing	political	debates	in	the	
name	of	human	rights	could	be	addressed	within	the	re-conceptualisation	of	the	multiple	dimen-
sions	of	human	rights.	
As	I	intend	to	focus	particularly	on	the	issues	of	positive	obligations	of	States	in	this	arti-
cle,	I	will	leave	other	effects	of	the	broadening	debate	on	human	rights	aside,	even	though	a	‘bigger	
picture’	of	expanding	human	rights	could	be	more	illustrative	in	some	situations.	
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At	least	in	Europe,	the	issue	of	positive	obligations	of	States	is	connected	with	the	case-law	
of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights.	In	its	seminal	ruling	in	the	Belgian Linguistic case,14 the Court 
responded	to	arguments	put	forth	by	the	Belgian	government	to	the	effect	that	the	Convention	con-
tains	a	set	of	negative	obligations	placed	upon	the	State	and	thus	cannot	oblige	the	State	to	act	with	
the	aim	to	exercising	the	rights	of	individuals.	The	Court’s	interpretation	of	the	Convention,	however,	
acknowledged	the	existence	of	positive	duties	on	the	part	of	States.	In	paragraph	4	of	its	ruling,	the	
Court	stated:	‘In	spite	of	its	negative	formulation,	this	provision	uses	the	term	“right”	and	speaks	of	a	
“right	to	education”.	Likewise,	the	preamble	to	the	Protocol	specifies	that	the	object	of	the	Protocol	lies	
in	the	collective	enforcement	of	“rights	and	freedoms”.	There	is	therefore	no	doubt	that	Article	2	(P1-
2)	does	enshrine	a	right.	.	.	.	The	negative	formulation	indicates,	as	is	confirmed	by	the	“preparatory	
work”,	that	the	Contracting	Parties	do	not	recognise	such	a	right	to	education	as	would	require	them	
to	establish	at	their	own	expense,	or	to	subsidise,	education	of	any	particular	type	or	at	any	particular	
level.	However,	it	cannot	be	concluded	from	this	that	the	State	has	no	positive	obligation	to	ensure	
respect	for	such	a	right	as	is	protected	by	Article	2	of	the	Protocol	(P1-2).’15 The Court connected this 
reasoning	with	Article	1	of	the	Convention,	which	requires	the	contracting	States	to	secure	the	rights	
and	freedoms	included	in	it	(Harris,	O’Boyle,	Bates,	&	Bucley,	2009,	p.	18).
However,	subsequent	case-law	showed	a	lack	of	unified	theory	of	positive	obligations	of	
the	State.	Lavrysen points	out	that	the	Court	itself	stated	in	1988	that	it	“does	not	have	to	develop	
a	general	theory	of	the	positive	obligations	which	may	flow	from	the	Convention”	(Lavrysen,	2013,	
p.	163,	referring	to	the	case	of	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	Platform ‘Ärzte für das Leben’ 
v Austria,	 application	Nr.	 10126/82,	 decision	of	 21	 June	 1988,	 paragraph	31).	The	 author	 thinks	
that	this	approach	of	the	Court	is	not	satisfactory	if	we	want	to	illustrate	and	construe	a	coherent	
theory.	Constitutional	 theory	 presents	 several	 aspects	 of	 positive	 obligations:	 firstly,	 in	 view	 of	
the	nature	of	certain	rights	(namely	socio-economic	rights),	they	cannot	be	effectively	protected	
without	action	on	the	part	of	the	State	(provides	health-care,	education,	social	benefits,	etc.);	other	
rights	(civil	and	political)	are	described	as	connected	with	positive	obligations	of	the	State,	e.g.	in	
terms	of	the	State’s	due	diligence	(Lavrysen,	2013,	p.	169),	as	the	obligation	of	the	State	to	protect	
and	implement	human	rights	(Bartoň	et	al.,	2016,	p.	60),	in	terms	of	protective	rights	(Alexy,	2002,	
p.	300),16	and	rights	connected	with	organisation	and	legal	processes	(Alexy,	2002,	p.	314f).17
These	functions	of	positive	obligations	can	be	further	categorised	and	distinguished	ac-
cording	to	their	relation	to	procedural	law	(e.g.	obligation	of	the	State	to	investigate	and	punish	
those	who	commit	crimes	that	violate	fundamental	rights	or	to	provide	a	procedure	for	compensa-
14 	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	case	‘relating	to	certain	aspects	of	the	laws	on	the	use	of	languages	in	education	in	
Belgium’	v.	Belgium,	applications	nr.	1474/62;	1677/62;	1691/62;	1769/63;	1994/63;	2126/64,	decision	of	23	July	1968.	
15 	Ibid.,	para	4.
16 	According	to	Alexy	(2002),	protective	rights	are	those	rights	which	their	holder	has	vis-à-vis	the	State	and	which	protect	
him	from	interference	by	third	parties.
17 	These	rights	cover	not	only	the	rights	to	enact	and	provide	for	the	performance	of	administrative	and	judicial	processes,	but	
also	the	rights	to	regulate	of	basic	concepts	of	private	law	(marriage,	inheritance…),	organise	broadcasting,	education,	etc.	
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tion	of	the	victims	of	a	crime)	or	substantive	law	(e.g.	the	duty	of	the	State	to	adopt	a	certain	regu-
lation	which	will	proscribe	certain	conduct)	(Bartoň	et	al.,	2016,	p.	61).	In	situations	where	juristic	
persons	violate	the	fundamental	rights	of	individuals,	we	can	identify	various	positive	obligations	
of	States	through	abstraction	and	classification	of	types	of	cases	in	which	a	violation	of	a	human	
right	can	be	found.
3 Positive obligations of States for violations of human rights committed by juristic 
persons
In	a	short	comparative	analysis,	Hoppe	(2011,	p.	111f)	presented	the	approaches	of	three	
international	judicial	or	quasi-judicial	bodies,	specifically	the	European	Court	of	Human	Rights,	the	
Human	Rights	Committee	interpreting	the	International	Covenant	on	Civil	and	Political	Rights	(IC-
CPR),	and	the	Inter-American	Court	on	Human	Rights.	She	focused	on	two	human	rights	–	the	right	
to	life	and	the	prohibition	of	torture,	cruel	and	inhuman	treatment	–	both	of	which	are	contained	in	
the	European	and	American	Conventions	on	Human	Rights	and	in	the	ICCPR.	The	scope	of	her	study	
was	restricted	to	observing	only	cases	involving	private	military	and	security	companies	(PMSC).
Even	in	such	a	narrow	selection	of	cases,	there	are	certain	differences	in	the	interpretation	
of	the	positive	obligations	of	States	ensuing	from	the	above-mentioned	rights.	I	will	nevertheless	
try	to	extrapolate	certain	general	types	of	positive	obligations	which	follow	from	case-law	and	doc-
trine	that,	in	my	opinion,	might	also	be	applicable	to	a	certain	degree	in	the	legal	relations	of	other	
private	persons,	at	least	from	an	analytical	point	of	view.	However,	specific	lines	of	interpretation	
influenced	by	other	contextual	factors	should	be	taken	into	account	in	practice.	According	to	some	
theories,	the	specific	form	of	positive	obligations	of	a	State	is	even	determined	by	the	perception	of	
law	or	world	views	of	individual	judges	who	hear	and	decide	individual	cases.18 
As	pointed	out	by	Francioni	and	other	authors,	certain	situations	may	occur	where	the	
conduct	of	a	juristic	person	can	be	attributed	directly	to	the	State.	These	situations	are	identified	in	
Articles	5	and	8	of	the	draft	Articles	on	Responsibility	of	States	for	Internationally	Wrongful	Acts	
adopted	by	the	International	Law	Commission	in	2001.	Under	the	Articles,	the	conduct	of	a	juristic	
person	may	be	attributable	to	the	State:	a)	if	a	private	entity	either	exercises	elements	of	govern-
mental	authority	(Art.	5)	or	b)	if	it	acts	on	the	instruction	of	or	under	the	direction	or	control	of	the	
State	(Art.	8)	(Francioni,	2011,	pp.	100-104;	Pinzauti,	2011,	p.	153).19 
A	different	set	of	obligations	of	the	State	relates	to	the	principle	of	effective	protection	
of	human	rights	within	its	territory;	it	follows	that	the	State	must	exercise	reasonable	control	over	
18 	A	view	which	is	endorsed	by	the	proponents	of	legal	realism	–	see	e.g.	Leiter	(2010,	p.	249).
19 	The	text	of	the	above-mentioned	draft	Articles	can	be	found	on	the	International	Law	Commission’s	website,	available	
at	<http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf>.
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compliance	with	human	rights	standards.20	In	a	situation	where	there	is	no	unity	as	to	the	extent	of	
positive	obligation	of	States,	it	seems	useful	to	mention	a	further	two	situations	in	which	a	juristic	
person	may	appear	and	point	out	the	differences	between	them.	Firstly,	there	may	exist	a	nexus	
between	the	State	and	a	corporation	–	e.g.	if	the	State	wholly	or	partially	owns	a	juristic	person,	if	a	
juristic	person	receives	the	State’s	guarantee,	financial	support,	etc.	(United	Nations	Committee	on	
Human	Rights,	2011,	p.	6).	The	second	category	concerns	situations	where	juristic	persons	neither	
perform	any	of	the	State’s	functions	nor	is	there	any	nexus	with	the	State.	The	reason	why	it	is	im-
portant	to	distinguish	between	various	categories	of	juristic	persons	and	their	relations	to	the	State	
lies	in	the	fact	that,	in	my	opinion,	the	State’s	duties	differ	in	each	of	these	situations.	
As	follows	from	case-law,	different	positions	of	juristic	persons	lead	to	different	scopes	of	
positive	obligations	of	the	State.	The	European	Court	of	Human	Rights	acknowledges	the	existence	
of	positive	obligations	of	the	State	in	cases	where	the	State	(governmental	authorities):	“a)	knew	or	
ought	to	have	known	of	a	real	and	immediate	risk	that	a	violation	can	be	committed	and	b)	failed	
to	take	measures	within	their	power	to	avoid	that	risk.”	(Pinzauti,	2011,	p.	154,	quoting	European	
Court	of	Human	Rights,	Osman v. U.K.,	application	Nr.	23452/94,	decision	of	28	October	1998).	
At	the	same	time,	however,	the	Court	interpreted	the	scope	of	positive	obligations	so	“as	not	to	
impose	on	states	an	impossible	or	disproportionate	burden:	they	are	only	required	to	take	measures	
within	their	powers,	and	that,	judged	reasonably,	might	have	been	expected	to	avoid	the	occurrence	
of	a	given	violation	of	the	Convention”	(Pinzauti,	2011,	p.	158).	The	key	question	to	be	answered	
is:	what should the State have known in terms of violation of fundamental rights by a private party? In	my	
opinion,	the	answer	to	this	question	differs	according	to	the	situation	of	the	juristic	person	and	its	
relation	to	the	State.	But	there	are	also	further	criteria	other	than	the	nature	of	the	legal	relationship	
between	the	State	and	the	juristic	person.	Some	of	them	will	be	illustrated	on	specific	examples	in	
the	Czech	Republic.	
  
4 ‘Crooks’ and other cases in the Czech Republic and the scope of the positive obligation 
of States 
No	private	military	and	security	companies,	such	as	Blackwater	 in	Iraq,	operate	 in	the	
region	of	Central	Europe,	nor	do	we	witness	any	grave	violations	of	standard	working	conditions	
like	in	the	developing	countries	of	Africa	or	Asia.	Companies	do	not	maintain	control	over	any	par-
ticular	territory	like	Royal	Dutch	Shell	company	which,	in	co-operation	with	the	Nigerian	military,	
supressed	local	resistance	to	oil	extraction	practices	in	Ogoniland	(Wells	&	Elias,	2005,	p.	144).	
Despite	this	fact,	debates	arise	from	to	time	on	the	subject	of	accountability	of	corpora-
tions,	especially	in	terms	of	violation	of	the	rights	of	employees,	the	rights	of	consumers	and	the	
20 	Francioni	(2011,	p.	110)	argues	that	international	human	rights	law	requires	States	to	exercise	sovereignty	in	such	a	way	
as	to	reasonably	prevent	activities	conducted	in	their	territory	from	causing	human	rights	violations	to	other	people.
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rights	of	an	affected	population.	Violation	of	the	rights	of	employees	in	the	Czech	Republic	can	be	
illustrated	on	the	publicly	leaked	internal	document	of	the	Lidl	chain	of	supermarkets,	regulating	
additional	bathroom	breaks	for	women	cashiers	during	menstruation.21 
The	 second	 example	 from	 the	Czech	Republic	 relates	 to	 violation	of	 the	 rights	 of	 the	
affected	population	in	the	city	of	Ostrava	(a	city	with	about	300,000	inhabitants	situated	in	the	
industrial	part	of	the	Czech	Republic),	where	large	steelworks	are	located	near	the	city	centre.	In	
this	case,	claimants	 living	close	to	the	factory	sued	the	company	for	constant	air	pollution.	The	
fundamental	right	to	a	healthy	environment	as	well	as	the	right	to	life	were	affected,	as	the	polluted	
area	houses	a	disproportionately	high	number	of	oncological	patients.
Another	highly	publicised	case	of	violation	of	rights	occurred	in	the	area	of	consumer	pro-
tection.	In	2012,	a	documentary	film	called	Šmejdi	(in	English,	“Crooks”)	triggered	a	broad	debate	
concerning	the	role	of	corporations	specialising	in	product	presentation	(and	selling)	events.	
The	film	showed	unfair,	manipulative	and	sometimes	even	coercive	practices	that	these	
companies	use	in	order	to	force	elderly	citizens	to	buy	their	products.	These	products	(kitchenware,	
mattresses,	 electrical	 appliances	 for	households,	 etc.)	 are	usually	 of	 poor	quality	 and	 sometimes	
priced	more	than	ten	times	above	their	actual	market	value.	The	product	presentation	events	are	
organised	exclusively	for	elderly	people	who	are	more	vulnerable	to	manipulative	techniques	and	
sometimes	get	confused	by	company	dealers	who	make	them	sign	a	contract	that	they	would	othe-
rwise	never	accept.	The	most	shocking	fact	in	this	case	was	that	the	companies	intentionally	aimed	
their	 product	presentation	 events	 at	 older	people,	 taking	 advantage	 of	 their	 social	 isolation	 and	
willingness	to	join	what	was	often	described	to	them	as	a	cultural	event.
Shortly	after	the	premiere	of	the	film,	the	Czech	Consumer	Protection	Act	was	amended	
to	extend	the	powers	of	the	Czech	Trade	Inspection	Authority	and	impose	further	duties	on	the	
organisers	of	these	selling	events.	
All	the	above-mentioned	examples	beg	two	questions:	Firstly,	were	the	fundamental	ri-
ghts	of	these	people	affected?	And	the	second	question:	Should	the	State	be	held	liable	for	the	mis-
conduct	of	private	corporations?
As	concerns	fundamental	rights,	the	second	example	is	clear	since	the	Czech	Charter	of	
Fundamental	Rights	and	Freedoms	comprises	both	the	right	to	the	protection	of	health	and	the	
right	to	a	favourable	environment	(in	Articles	31	and	35,	respectively).	The	first	and	the	third	exam-
ples	both	 relate	primarily	 to	private-law	contracts	 (between	employers	and	employees,	between	
entrepreneurs	and	consumers).	However,	several	arguments	can	be	made	as	to	why	these	cases	also	
pertain	to	fundamental	rights.	The	first	lies	in	a	gross	imbalance	between	the	two	parties,	while	the	
second	concerns	the	massive	abuse	of	the	stronger	position	which	led	to	violation	of	rights	relating	
21	 	Available	at:	<http://zpravy.idnes.cz/obchod-chtel-oznacit-pokladni-s-menstruaci-f2o-/domaci.aspx?c=A040728_213047_
domaci_mad>.
56
Pavel Ondrejek
Joaçaba, v. 19, n. 1, p. 45-60, jan./abr. 2018 EJJL
to	the	dignity	and	personality	of	the	weaker	party.	In	the	case	of	Lidl,	this	was	a	duty	imposed	on	
women	cashiers	to	wear	a	headband	and	thus	expose	one	of	the	most	intimate	spheres	of	their	lives.	
In	the	case	of	“Crooks”,	this	lies	in	massive	coercion	and	manipulation,	which	not	only	renders	the	
contracts	 invalid	and	might	even	be	assessed	as	criminal	practice,	but	the	humiliation	of	elderly	
people	and	their	‘objectification’	also	interfered	with	their	freedom,	dignity	and	personal	rights.	
The	 search	 for	an	answer	 to	 the	 second	question,	 i.e.	 the	 scope	of	 the	State’s	positive	
obligation	leads	us	back	to	the	issue	of	due	diligence	on	the	part	of	the	State,	which	should	simulta-
neously	not	impose	an	unreasonable	burden.	
The	first	and	third	examples	have	 in	common	that	they	concern	primarily	private-law	
relations	(between	buyers	and	sellers	and	between	employers	and	employees).	What	is	the	criterion	
of	due	diligence	here?	In	my	opinion,	it	should	relate	to	the	knowledge	of	governmental	authorities	
of	the	conduct	of	private	persons.	Hoppe	(2011,	p.	113)	argues	that	as	concerns	PMSCs,	repeated	
violation	of	human	rights	increases	the	duty	of	the	State.	I	consider	that	stricter	demands	would	
lead	to	undesired	extension	of	the	State’s	control	and	its	intrusion	into	private	legal	relations.	
The	second	of	the	mentioned	examples	relates	to	State	control	within	public-law	regu-
lation.	Due	diligence	is	certainly	higher	in	this	case	and	is	set	by	legal	rules	(in	this	example,	rules	
on	pollution	control).	The	nexus	might	also	be	closer	if	the	corporation	received	State	subsidies	or	
guarantees,	or	if	it	had	contracts	with	the	State.	In	all	these	situations,	a	policy	of	no	human	rights	
violations	committed	by	the	corporation	should	be	strictly	demanded	by	the	State.		
Conclusion
In	line	with	Francioni	(2011,	p.	98),	it	can	be	argued	that	under	the	current	circumstances	
and	without	a	major	change	in	jurisprudence	and	case-law,	we	need	to	remain	focused	on	the	role	
of	the	State	as	a	guarantor	of	human	rights,	rather	than	on	imposing	human	rights	obligations	on	
entities	of	private	law.	When	a	private	juristic	person	violates	a	fundamental	right,	several	situations	
can	occur:	if	the	juristic	person	performs	the	functions	of	the	State	or	acts	on	the	instruction	of	or	
under	the	direction	or	control	of	the	State,	then	its	conduct	is	attributable	to	the	State	directly	and	
no	positive	obligation	arises.
In	other	 situations,	 the	 scope	of	positive	obligations	varies	depending	on	a	number	of	
factors,	most	often	on	the	nexus	between	the	State	and	the	juristic	person	–	a	broader	scope	is	pre-
sumed	in	case	of	closer	relations	stemming	from	State	ownership	or	on	the	basis	of	a	certain	form	
of	contractual	relationship	between	the	juristic	person	and	the	State.	
Finally,	if	there	is	no	link	between	the	State	and	the	juristic	person,	the	State’s	duty	to	
prevent	violation	of	fundamental	rights	by	a	private	entity	must	be	interpreted	in	such	a	way	as	not	
to	impose	an	unreasonable	burden	on	the	State	and	its	duty	to	provide	control	and	oversee	transac-
tions	among	private	persons.	On	the	other	hand,	as	shown	in	the	examples	from	the	Czech	Repu-
57
Can positive obligations...
Joaçaba, v. 19, n. 1, p. 45-60, jan./abr. 2018EJJL
blic,	juristic	persons	occasionally	violate	the	rights	of	vulnerable	groups	(elderly	people,	employees)	
where	specific,	even	preventive,	powers	of	competent	authorities	of	the	State	should	be	enacted.	
In	case	of	an	already	reported	violation	of	fundamental	rights,	positive	obligations	of	the	State	to	
legislate	on	and	control	the	observance	of	laws	should	be	increased.	To	conclude,	the	nature	of	the	
relationship	of	a	juristic	person	to	the	state	is	not	the	only	relevant	aspect	as	we	also	scrutinise	the	
activities	of	the	juristic	person	in	question.
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